

Restructuring the Administration of Metropolitan Manila

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Metropolitan Governance through the Metro-Manila Commission (MMC) has not functioned the way it was conceived. This is mainly because PD 824, which provided for the establishment of the MMC was not adhered to and was misused to suit certain political interests during the Marcos administration. Abolition of the MMC however is not advocated but restructuring and reorganization of the existing Metropolitan administration is needed to make it more responsive to the needs of urbanism. Several alternative organization patterns are presented here. These include: the revival of the ad hoc Metropolitan Coordinating Council; the creation of a Manila Metropolitan Government; the organization of a Metropolitan Manila Authority; the Metro-Wide Service Agencies; and the Metropolitan Manila Federation. Whatever organization pattern would be adopted, certain significant issues must be taken into account, some of which include accelerated redemocratization, further enhancement of decentralization and local autonomy, and the promotion of economic and social development in the Metropolitan region.

Introduction

A current critical issue in Philippine politico-administrative affairs is whether the present organization and system of metropolitan governance in Metro Manila should be dismantled, replaced or reorganized. Corollary to the issue would be whether Metropolitan Manila should be disintegrated and its constituent cities and municipalities reintegrated with the provinces to which they belonged originally as geographic and component parts.

Certain sectors of the metropolitan community have been agitating for the abolition of the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC). Not to mention their argument that the Commission is a creation of the past regime and its abolition was promised by the present administration—they contend that the metropolitan organization has failed to cope with the increasingly serious urban problems of the Metro region and has been unable to render the necessary coordination of metro-wide services. They also contend that the establishment of another tier in the local government political and administrative hierarchy has considerably reduced the political powers of the local units in the Metro area; and that the abolition of local councils resulting from the establishment of the metropolitan body has drastically weakened the political status of the component cities and municipalities of the Metro area.

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The move is not only to abolish MMC, but to disintegrate the Metropolitan Region. In fact, a bill has been introduced in Congress to return to Rizal the municipalities that were once within the territorial jurisdiction of that province. On the other hand, there is another bill introduced proposing the creation of a Metropolitan Manila Authority to replace the Metropolitan Manila Commission. Another specific instance of conflict may be discerned. The incumbent Mayor of the City of Manila, and maybe one or two other city and municipal executives have unequivocally expressed their stand against the maintenance of the present Metropolitan government and have advocated its dismantling, while the greater majority of the local executives would not want a re-annexation of their municipalities with their former parent provinces—Rizal and Bulacan.

In the midst of this raging controversy, our legislators, policy makers and public administrators are placed in a difficult position, being confronted with the problem of what to do with the system of governance in Metro Manila.

This paper attempts to help them take a more enlightened and rational stand on the prevailing issue; it is also an attempt to share in the effort to guide the Government in reflecting on the implications of its legislative action and policy decision on the matter. Five areas of discussion are dealt with in this paper: the salient facts on the discrete local government systems and the administration of public services in the Metro Region in the early seventies, which necessitated the establishment of a metropolitan system of governance; actual organization and operation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission; concept, issues and problems of metropolitan governance; some alternative organization models of metropolitan administration; and proposals and issues on restructuring the administration of Metropolitan Manila.

Metropolitan Manila in the Seventies

A study on metropolitan governance in Metro Manila requires a brief flashback to the problems and conditions obtaining in the seventies which necessitated the establishment of an integrated administrative system.

As any big city in the Third World, Manila, the burgeoning metropolis, had to contend with the social phenomenon of rapid increase in population size and density and continuous flow of in-migration which spawned multifarious problems typical of a highly urbanized center. Slum and squatter settlements, chaotic transport system and heavy traffic congestion, criminality substandard and inadequate shelter program, inundation of certain areas of the city during the rainy season, inefficient refuse collection, and unhygienic waste disposal—these were the most critical problems that afflicted Metro Manila in the seventies (which, of course, have persisted until now). Urban in nature, these problems, with the scope and extent of their prevalence, would transcend

local boundaries; that is, they exist in and affect not only Manila but also the contiguous cities and municipalities. The efficient and effective approach to these metropolitan-wide problems would be by the cities and municipalities working together, closely coordinating with each other. The problems would defy any management intervention that would be applied by the local units individually.

Growing side by side with the complexity and technical nature of urban problems was the demand for more responsive and adequate governmental services and a more efficient and effective urban services delivery system.

Multiplicity of Governments in the Metropolis: The Establishment of the Metropolitan Manila Commission

Before their integration into one body politic, the four cities were semi-autonomous political and administrative units of government, while the thirteen municipalities were geographical component towns of the provinces in which they were located.

The four cities had their own charters which provided for the election and appointment of their sets of officials and the organization of their offices and defined their administrative functions and operations. They were not controlled by provincial authorities or a senior level of government below the Chief Executive. In the case of the municipalities, the provincial government, a higher tier of government, exercised administrative supervision over them. With much less autonomy, they were being controlled by the province within whose geographical boundaries they belonged.

Each local unit was responsible for providing services to its constituency within its territorial jurisdiction, which include the administration and financing of the services. Having stipulated sources of revenue and entitled to internal revenue allotments (specific percentage shares from collections of national taxes), plus special subsidies and grants from the national government, the city or municipality had to operate within the capacity that could be generated out of these financial resources. Normally, therefore, the degree and quality of public services rendered by a city or municipality, and perhaps even the extent of development, would depend in large measure upon its financial capacity. Under these circumstances, there was a marked disparity among the metropolitan local units, even among the four cities, in terms of revenue, income, services, and administrative capability. Makati, for instance, which has retained its category as an ordinary municipality, had an income of ₱78.6 M, comparable to the ₱79.3 M of Quezon City and tremendously bigger than the combined incomes of Caloocan and Pasay, ₱24.9 M and ₱19.8 M, respectively.¹

This very wide gap in income level among the local units, which might be attributed to their inherent revenue-generation capacities and could hardly be remedied by existing national-local intergovernmental fiscal relations, had an obvious implication on the extent and quality of services that each of the communities in the Metro Region was capable of rendering. While Quezon City, for example, could afford to buy a ₱10.6 M incinerator (which, by the way, became a non-functioning "white elephant" that entailed staggering maintenance costs on the city's budget), a town like Pateros did not even have any system of garbage collection and disposal system to speak of. In terms of refuse collection and disposal equipment, the inequity could also be illustrated by Malabon and Pasay: Malabon had a smaller population (141,000) but maintained more garbage trucks (8) than the latter, which had a population of 274,000, with only four garbage trucks.² It would not be surprising, therefore, to find that one municipality, say Makati, would be relatively cleaner, because of the more regular collection of refuse and more adequate facilities than the other municipalities across the boundary, which had not been frequented by refuse collecting trucks for sometime.

One other problem that was brought about by the semi-independent relationship of the local government units in the Metro Area was the uncoordinated delivery of Metro-wide services and disintegrated approach to problems that traverse municipal boundaries. Local government agencies undertook their projects without interconsultation with each other. That the laws and ordinances were enforced by the cities and municipalities in varying degrees of stringency and imposition of sanctions made it possible for the perpetration of offenses like local tax evasion, littering on streets and dumping of refuse on the wrong places, traffic violation, and squatting on public lands or other people's properties. Criminal offenders could elude apprehension because of territorially defined police jurisdictions. Flood control installations in one municipality might not be workable, because of the deficient drainage systems in the adjoining municipalities. The projects of the Department of Public Works and Highways were not synchronized with those of other agencies like the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, thus causing perennial excavations on main thoroughfares that would terribly inconvenience the public, not to mention the senseless waste of manpower and financial resources.

Another situation obtaining then was the undertaking of projects that were more reflective of the values and aspirations of the local politicians rather than their attempts to respond to the problems of urbanization. The general consensus was that decisions on local services were made on the basis of their political impact, and not on the projected benefits that would accrue to the greater majority of Metropolitan Manila's population.

These instances of inequity in the provision of services, non-coordination of local government programs, and ineffective observance of city/municipal ordinances represent only a cluster of the problems that emanated from the disjointed systems of governance operating in the Metropolitan Region.

Metropolitan Manila typified that political subdivision which, according to Robert Wood, is characterized by the existence of many governments with common economic and social framework.³

A form of integration was sought and somehow had to be designed and introduced—one that would provide a more effective governmental strategy for the development of Metro Manila and greater responsiveness to its increasingly complex problems.

By virtue of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 824 which was promulgated on November 1975 and implemented in 1976, the four cities and 13 municipalities were integrated into one body politic and a metropolitan government was created which virtually was another level of authority above the cities and municipalities within the Metro Area. The Metropolitan Manila Commission was established assuming the functions of the city and municipal governments and discharging certain services originally under the direct supervision of the local units.

The Nature of Metropolitan Services and The Need for Metropolitanization

“The great problems which demand governmental action in metropolitan communities, ...hold political boundaries in contempt.” Out of all this would rise “some movement for unification, complete or partial, such as will ensure the broad treatment of metropolitan problems by a centralized authority.”⁴

Cognizant of the interdependence of the local units and the inter-relatedness of their problems that do not recognize territorial boundaries, policy makers and the central government authorities are confronted with the issue of multiplicity of local governments operating within the Metro Area. They are aware of the correlation between the administrative system and the kind of governmental services rendered. They know that governmental restructuring may be imperative but they also know the implications of whatever governmental reorganization that is to be effected. And this is the problem that constrains a decision as to what model of metropolitan governance should be adopted.

Alan K. Campbell maintains that there is “no internally consistent theory which can be used to guide either the placement of governmental

functions or the design of a system in which to place those functions.⁶ But there is no denying the need for a conurbation of the cities and municipalities, which are economically and socially interrelated. There is also the general consensus among policy makers, urban planners, local governments experts, and even the residents of the Metro Region that a system of governance with a metropolitan-wide jurisdiction has inherent advantages, such as those already intimated earlier: optimization of service benefits and minimization of operational costs as a result of the consolidation of functions and activities administered by a larger unit of government; technical efficiency in administrative operations that would insure better coordinated services; more equitable financing of local development programs; and, provision of services that could be made possible because of the existence of a body, making a general evaluation of both the resources and needs of each local unit.

It may be relevant at this point to cite J. Stefan Dupre's application of Paul Samuelson's "public goods"⁶ theory in the analysis of public services that may be classified as metropolitan in nature, i.e., urban services that traverse the boundaries of political units.⁷ Dupre states that public goods have the essential characteristics of having "externalities" or "spill-over" effects. "Depending on its scale, a public good can be conceived as appropriately 'packaged' if the boundaries of the unit of government providing that good are such that the externalities of the good are internalized to the public served... Given the size of the area required to internalize a good, the appropriate provider of that good is the government whose territorial jurisdiction coincides with the requisite area."⁸ The maintenance of playgrounds and parks, fire protection, construction of public markets, and provision of parking facilities are examples of public goods whose spill-overs can be internalized at the lowest level of government. But such services as police, transport, pollution control, water supply, sewage disposal have externalities that require extensive control and, therefore, should be assigned to the level of government with wider jurisdiction.

The second cluster of local government services, together with drainage and flood control, refuse disposal, land use and zonification, should be elevated to the metro level for administration. As "public goods," they have their externalities. Efficiency in the delivery of said services cannot be maximized unless they are assigned at the level, and within the jurisdiction, of government that can internalize their benefits or control their "spill-over" effects. There is no question that they would warrant large territorial jurisdiction as that of a metro government. And if the externalities would necessarily be contained within the jurisdiction of a higher level and larger organization size of local government than a city or municipality, then this implicitly warrants the integration of the fragmented units of local administration in the Metro Region.

Organization and Performance of the Commission

At this juncture, one question may be posed: how has the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) been responding to the metropolitan problems and services described? A fundamental observation that may explain the difficulty of assessing the operational performance of the Metropolitan administrative system and determining how efficiently and effectively the metro-wide services are carried out, is that, the MMC has not really been made to function the way it was designed and envisioned. PD 824 provides for a commission form of government that should formulate and administer policies as a collegial body. The MMC however, never functioned as such, for it was a one-lady-governor entity. In fact, during its early years of operation, no commissioners, as provided in PD 824 were officially appointed; there was constituted instead a brigade of so-called action officers for finance, planning, health, infrastructure, education, transport and traffic, etc.

Another politico-administrative phenomenon that has taken place upon the institution of the Metro Manila Government is that the four cities and the thirteen municipalities have lost their political status, having been reduced to mere administrative districts of the Metro Region, which was not the intention of PD 824. For instance, the city and municipal councils have been abolished; thus, the city and municipal governments have been deprived of their power to pass local ordinances. They have also lost their direct supervision and authority over services that may be classified as purely local, like environmental sanitation. Fiscal operations in the local units have been placed almost completely under the administrative control and supervision of MMC through its Commissioner of Finance.

Admittedly, the organizational and operational deficiencies of the MMC, which may be partly, if not mainly attributed to the non-adherence to the basic concept, organization and functions of Metropolitan governance as envisioned and provided in PD 824 would not be the sole cause of the still prevalent or unimproved delivery of services in Metro Manila. That environmental sanitation remains to be inefficiently handled, with piles of refuse and waste uncollected in certain areas, that Metro Manila continues to suffer from floods during rainy season, that transport and traffic system persists to be in utter confusion, and that these major critical services in Metro Manila have remained the objects of severe complaints from the people in the Metro Area, may be due to some factors, which may be political and/or behavioral. An authority in urban administration and metropolitan governance, Leonard Goodall, holds the view that it would be too simplistic to suggest that the problem of metropolitan areas is one of inadequate governmental structure. But he recognizes the fact that the structure of government could be a complicating factor in dealing with metropolitan problems.⁹

A restructuring of the administrative system, a review of the political powers of the Commission in relation with the local units, and an improvement of its operations could indirectly bring about considerable relief from the problems of urban living in Metro Manila and from dissatisfaction with the services being provided therein.

Implicit in the discussion above is the observation that the present organization and system of Metropolitan governance has not been functioning the way it was conceived. If we are to make an evaluation of the performance and operations of the MMC during the past administration and the present, we will surely identify some significant organizational weaknesses and operational deficiencies.

But these may be attributed to those who were and are managing it and the manner it was and is being run, and therefore should not invalidate the rationale for creating the organization. These weaknesses and deficiencies should not destroy the concept of integrating the political units, the system of metropolitanizing the services affecting them and the need for organizing a metropolitan government for the four cities and the 13 municipalities.

Proposed Organizational Models

The total abolition of the MMC organization and system is, therefore, not being advocated. Considering the merits and rationale for a metropolitan system of governance as have been expounded on, the proposal would be to restructure and reorganize the existing Metropolitan administration, making it more responsive to the problems and needs of urbanism and more capable of undertaking services in a metropolitan community.

As to what organization structure would be most suitable for the Manila Metropolis is the crucial question. The local executives and officials of the cities and municipalities involved are naturally concerned with the implications of any model for restructuring Metro Manila governance, which would either ensure their support of the reorganization or spell out their opposition to it. In fact, the lurking objection of the local executives to the creation of the MMC emanated from the results of the MMC establishment: the vertical expansion of the bureaucratic hierarchy; the shifting of inter-local authority relationships; the diminution of their traditional powers and prerogatives; and the narrowing of the domain of their responsibilities for vital services. What would be most unpalatable, especially to the city mayors, is the loss of their cities' political status. This has resulted from a reorganization that transformed them into mere administrative units of a regional government. The fractural governments of the metropolis, opines Dupre, "are political arenas whose relative homogeneity endows certain interests with competitive advantages. The result is that any departure from the status quo that endangers these arenas meets ferocious resistance."¹⁰

Metropolitan Coordinating Council

It is not difficult, therefore, to understand if the proposed organizational design that would be most acceptable to the local executives is the *ad hoc* type, which may be called the Metropolitan Coordinating Council. Composed of representatives of the mayors and/or representatives of the cities and municipalities of Metro Manila, the Council which is designed neither to be operating or line, much less a governing entity, would serve as a consultative and advisory body with the main function of coordinating metro-wide programs and activities of the local unit.

This type of metro organization may be considered a moderate and conservative approach to the administration of the Metro Area. It is the most democratic of all the alternative models being proposed in this paper. But since it does not have an ounce of clout or administrative authority, the coordinating council type would be the weakest. Perhaps to the mayors whose political motivations and desire for preserved political powers are placed above administrative efficiency values, this metro organizational device would be the most acceptable but predictably would be inutile. If it would be adopted, the administration of public services in the Metropolitan Region would not be any different from that during the pre-martial law period—uncoordinated, fragmented, and inefficient due to the fractural governments of the Metropolis. Our experience with the weak regional development councils should serve as a lesson.

Manila Metropolitan Government (MMC With Variations)

In this model, the present organization of metropolitan governance has to be modified—the modified features would adhere to some provisions of PD 824 and to the organization and system originally envisioned.

Metropolitan Manila will be maintained or established as a political subdivision of the state and as another tier of government in the political and administrative hierarchy, vested with certain powers and functions that a regional government may exercise. Under this model, Metropolitan Manila should function both as a provincial and municipal government. If it functions as a commission form of government, with the Chairman or Governor and the three commissioners (for planning, finance, and operations), then it should formulate and administer policies as a collegial body.

As mentioned earlier, MMC has never functioned as a commission. The four cities and the thirteen municipalities have been reduced to mere administrative districts of the Metro Region. The city and municipal councils, have been abolished, depriving the city and municipal governments the power to pass local ordinances.

Perhaps the Metropolitan Government, remaining as another tier of government, would operate more effectively if the local councils would be re-instituted and the four cities and the thirteen municipalities will have some of their political powers restored and enjoy a significant degree of autonomy, while the Metropolitan Manila Government at the same time, exercises general supervision over the local units. With the super-imposed structure between the central government and the city/municipal governments, this model depicts both a centralized and decentralized division of authority and power. While the first model, the coordinating council type, would be the most liberal and democratic, this model of having another political and administrative layer in the local government hierarchy, represents an organization with strong political status and can wield firm authority and control upon the local governments.

This model of metropolitan governance with another tier placed above the local governments is working effectively in Metropolitan Tokyo, which functions both as a prefecture or province and a city. (But there is one significant fact about Metropolitan Tokyo - it evolved from the status of a big city or a highly urbanized center, hence, Metropolitan Tokyo was originally, the City of Tokyo.)

Metropolitan Manila Authority

A semi-corporate body known as the Metro Manila Authority, may be established, with a Metropolitan Board as the governing body composed of the mayors of the four cities and the thirteen municipalities. From among the members of the Board will be selected the Chairman who will serve as the Chief Executive Officer. He shall be assisted by a professional Metropolitan Manager. The Board will serve as the policy-making body while the Chief Executive Officer, assisted by the Metropolitan Manager, will implement the policies formulated by the Board.

These policy making and policy execution functions or policy decisions and executive functions must be concerned mainly with the identified Metro-wide services.

Unlike the Metro Manila Government model which actually represents another tier of local government, MMA is not meant to be established as a super-imposed body between the central government and the local units. The four cities and thirteen municipalities will remain as they are—as political subdivisions of the state, they will continue to exercise their political powers, administer services which are local in nature, except for those enumerated above, which should then be elevated to the Metro level. (This is the organization model envisioned in a pending bill in Congress.)

Metro-Wide Service Agencies

In this organization model, several special-purpose agencies may be established, which may function as separate entities and are not placed under the control of one political governing body. Each of these agencies is responsible for a particular metro-wide service or any of the metro-wide services - environmental sanitation, flood control, physical planning and zonification, police and fire, and transport and traffic. Merely coordinating with the city and municipal governments as far as the metro-wide services they render are concerned, they do not exercise any line authority over the local units.

This approach or model has the weakness of lacking in comprehensiveness. Setting up agencies or authorities separately, each to be responsible for a particular service would not provide an integrated or comprehensive treatment of metropolitan needs and interests.

At present, there are two agencies of this type of metropolitan organization operating in Metro Manila—the Manila Transit Corporation and the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System.

Metropolitan Manila Federation

The federation type could be a compromise model between the Coordinating Council and the superimposed-structure model (Metro Government). It insures the autonomy of the local units and at the same time exercises reasonably sufficient control at the Metro level. This model is based on the premise that the Metropolitan Region is perceived as a federation of four cities and 13 municipalities. The purpose, therefore, in this model is to create federalism at the Metropolitan level, which means the retention of a multiplicity of semi-autonomous local governments and the assurance that no giant structure superimposed on them is being created. But there is to be established - the Metropolitan Federation Council composed of the city and municipal mayors of the local units serving as *ex-officio* council members, with an elected or appointed chairman, which would function in much the same way as a cabinet form of government.

The Federation model may be similar to the Metro Manila Government in that, under the former, a distinct system or level of government is established. But it may differ from MMG as far as the composition of the governing body is concerned. The political and administrative representation of the local units are pronounced in the federation model, whereas, not in the MMG model. The decisions and ordinances of the Federation, which are authored by the council members - the city/municipal mayors - are enforced

by the Mayors themselves. Compared with the Metro Manila Authority Model, which is more of a semi-corporate body and a service agency, the federation type of governance partakes the nature of a political unit. It exercises political powers and general supervision over the local units. But its decisions, reached as collegial decisions, should have the force of law upon the local units.

A very significant feature of this model, which Metropolitan Toronto is patterned after is that, while the Metropolitan Council may function as a regional government, it should not necessarily undermine the political being nor interfere in the purely local affairs, of the four cities and 13 municipalities.

Issues and Proposals for Consideration in the Reorganization

In restructuring the administration of Metropolitan Manila, certain issues have to be considered in the context of three national policy goals—accelerated redemocratization, further enhancement of decentralization and local autonomy, and promotion of economic and social development in the Metropolitan Region. Regardless of the organization pattern to be applied and organization model to be introduced, these issues and principles, complemented with some specific proposals, should serve as cornerstone and guidepost in the reorganization effort and in the enactment of the appropriate legislation and process of administrative decision-making.

Restoration of the Local Councils

In line with the enunciated policy of the Government to promote local autonomy, the restoration of the city and municipal councils, which the metropolitan local authorities have long been clamoring for, should be a primordial political and administrative intervention in the metropolitan reorganization. The abolition of the local councils, which in effect curtailed the representative participation in ordinance making of the people in Metro Manila was one manifest transgression of democracy by the past authoritarian regime, as far as Metro Manila was concerned. Irrespective of what type of Metro governing body to be instituted, the people's representation in local legislation should by all means be returned. No political and administrative reform could be more demonstrative of redemocratization in the Metropolitan Community than giving back the people's voice in the passage of local legislative measures and in the formulation of programs and policies affecting them.

Administrative Structure, Powers and Functions

The various alternative models of administration have been presented. In selecting the type of metropolitan organization, the governing principle is

that it should uphold the democratic processes by having in its membership representatives of the local governments and selected sectors of the Metropolis and by insuring the accessibility of metro-wide services by the people, and at the same time should maintain the standards of efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of those services.

The reorganization pattern may call for the institution of another layer of government which must exercise sufficient control to insure the integrated performance of the operating local entities, but the political and autonomous character of the cities and municipalities of the metro area should be protected. This can be realized by having a clear delineation of the powers and functions of the Metro government/authority/federation or whatever it may be called. Its supervisory powers, as pointed out earlier, should deal mainly with the administration of the public services to be defined in the law as metropolitan in nature and scope.

Financing the Metro Administrative Systems

The revenue powers and funding sources of the Metro Administration may be determined on the basis of its political structure and administrative organization. If Metropolitan Manila is treated as a political subdivision of the State, say, as a province, then it can be vested with political powers, including the power to levy taxes and generate its own financial resources; it should share in the collection of municipal taxes, and must be entitled to the same financial grants and aids from the national government, like internal revenue allotments and development funds.

With respect to Metropolitan fiscal relationship, the principle of equity should be observed both in the sharing of revenues between Metro Manila and the local units and the allocation of financial resources to and among the latter. The more equitable distribution of financial resources, in which the poorer municipalities may somehow be assisted financially by the richer cities and municipalities, was one of the objectives of establishing the Metro Manila government. This is a sound financial arrangement but is not acceptable to the more affluent cities and municipalities whose local officials claim that it should be the responsibility of the national government to grant that financial assistance to the municipalities.

It may be recommended that the present practice of the MMC to exact 15% contributions (which used to be 20%) from the general funds of the cities and municipalities should be discontinued, if only to eliminate this one irritant in the relationship between the MMC and the city/municipal governments. But on the other hand, if ever the cities and municipalities continue to contribute to the pooled funds of MMC, it is but fair that they should share in the costs of Metro-wide services delivery, which presumably they all benefit

from. That the majority of the 17 cities/municipalities are getting in return metropolitan services worth more than their 15% contributions is borne out by the financial statements examined by this author.

Administration of the Metro-wide Services

It may be superfluous to suggest that the major responsibility of the new or reorganized Metro Administration is to respond to the urban problems of the Metropolitan Community and provide the services needed, with the ultimate goal of promoting social and economic development, thus making the Metropolis a wholesome place to live in. It goes without saying that the Metro-wide services identified should be administered with utmost efficiency and effectiveness, which means regular refuse collection and sanitary waste disposal, orderly and convenient transport and traffic system, environmental pollution control, rational land use and spatial planning, reduced inundation in certain areas, etc.

Voluminous studies have been conducted on these Metropolitan problems and services; and something must be done to implement the results of these studies.

Preserving the Integrity of the Region

If a plebiscite would be conducted to determine how many of the 13 municipalities would decide to return to their original parent provinces, this author can be almost completely certain that based on his interactions with Metro Manila local executives and officials, the majority of the local units would opt for preserving the integrity of the Metro Region. Fully aware that they would gain no benefit - financially, politically, socially and economically from their re-annexation with their original provinces, these municipalities would reject the pending bill in Congress which restores the original areas and boundaries of Rizal and Bulacan provinces.

Regardless of the political and administrative form of Metro governance that may be set-up, Metro Manila should remain as an integrated political subdivision of the State. Reverting to its fragmented political status, which, as explained earlier, had caused serious and formidable problems—economic, social and political— would be tantamount to retrogression, instead of transformation into a progressive and modern metropolis like the other metropolitan cities in the world.

Endnotes

¹Raul P. de Guzman, "Alternatives for Metropolitan Governance," *Local Government Bulletin* (Local Government Center, UP, January - June 1975), p. 6.

²Inter-Agency Committee on Metropolitan Manila, *Metropolitan Manila Authority: A Development and Reform Strategy Proposal* (Manila, 1973).

³Robert C. Wood, "Metropolitan Government, 1975: An Extrapolation of Trends," *American Political Science Review*, LII (March 1958), p. 111.

⁴*National Municipal Review*, Vol. II, 1922, p. 229.

⁵Alan K. Campbell, "Metropolitan Governance and the National Metropolis," in Charles Leven, *The Mature Metropolis* (Toronto: Lexington, 1978).

⁶Paul Samuelson defines "public good" as one which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good.

⁷Stefan Dupre, "Intergovernmental Relations and the Metropolitan Area," a paper submitted to the Bureau of Municipal Research, Toronto, Canada in February 1967 in connection with the centennial study on metropolitan problems.

⁸Dupre, *ibid.*

⁹Leonard Goodall, *The American Metropolis* (Chicago: Mervill Publishing Company, 1968), p. 79.

¹⁰Dupre, *op. cit.*